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GLOBAL FORCES OF CORPORATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN 
PATH-DEPENDENCIES 
I. 
Edited academic collections on topics that have entered the public 
consciousness, well beyond scholarly circles, constitute a risk for the 
editors, the authors and the publishers. In the fast-evolving world of 
academic publishing, with its constant increase in paper-based and online 
venues for disseminating expert knowledge, the status of a carefully 
edited volume of substantial content and length remains ambiguous. 
This explains why many pieces included in a volume like the one here 
under review will have previously appeared in academic journals or, 
often, as working papers on the omnipresent Social Science Research 
Network. Why then take on in such a volume the task-as editor or, 
indeed, as publisherof assembling previously published articles and of 
soliciting further original work from some of the most renowned experts 
in the field? 
While such general observations might be prompted by the 
appearance of a 700 page volume that convenes some of the leading 
scholars in U.S. and European corporate law to assess the 2000 crash of 
"Wall Street's darling," the Enron corporation, any doubts over the need 
for this publication are quickly brushed aside once the volume is opened. 
  
After Enron presents an excellent and timely collection of analyses of the 
Enron debacle, provided by some of the most astute and informed 
corporate law scholars, and masterfully integrated by two of the finest 
academics in this field. The editors, John Armour and Joseph McCahery, 
have succeeded in collecting, conceptualizing and organizing a most 
comprehensive and intriguing collection of excellent writings on Enron 
and its aftermath. Their book can aptly serve as either a first-blush or a 
more in-depth analysis of the problems, for those conducting research as 
well as those teaching in the area of corporate and securities law. Yet, 
beyond this achievement, the editors also contribute importantly to a 
literature which has for some time now emphasized the need to take a 
deliberately comparative viewpoint when analyzing the trajectories of 
corporate law development around the world. 1 This work has only more 
recently begun to explore the existing differences in greater depth and 
with a view to the historical, political and socio-economical context of 
company law regulation.2 This move to a "deeper reading" of the 
contextual conditions of the regulatory framework of companies' 
activities in advanced3 and developing nations4 is unlikely to be reversed 
in the near future, given the growing awareness that corporate 
governance is irrevocably developing into a multi-layered body of 
transnational law. Corporate and securities law rules form part of a 
complex regulatory environment, which is historically grown and 
continues to develop along co-evolutionary lines of official/unofficial, 
hard/soft law legislation, and which involves modes of public and private 
  
ordering with direct and indirect regulatory effects.5 
 
II. 
What was Enron? Emerging in the 1990s as an overwhelmingly 
successful corporate actor with a keen sense for the transforming political 
climate, marked by a forceful embrace of large-scale deregulation and 
privatization policies, Enron emerged as arguably the smoothest player in a 
fast unfolding energy trading game-until, in late 2001, its name became a 
signifier worldwide for a plethora of regulatory failings, personal 
misconduct and largest-scale financial and existential losses.6 Enron's fall 
from the global capital market's grace was brought about by its 
management's outrageous collaboration in reducing corporate assets and 
misstating the company's financial status. Enron's dealings, which led to 
wide-reaching criminal prosecution, have been among the prime 
homework-providers for corporate law regulators in just about every 
jurisdiction worldwide. 7 
Within the last few years, the U.S. Congress' 2002 SarbanesOxley 
legislation (a.k.a. SOX) has become a formula for similarminded 
corporate governance law reform worldwide.8 Today, as SOX attracts 
criticism for allegedly unreasonably raising compliance costs,9 the Act's 
Section 404 and other countries' similar regulations10 are under 
heightened scrutiny. Section 404 requires the creation of extensive 
policies and controls within public companies to secure, document, 
  
process, and verify material information dealing with financial results. 
Essentially, it requires that each annual report filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission-overseeing "reporting companies" with at 
least 300 shareholders and minimum assets of U.S. $500 million-contain 
an internal control report. That report must detail management's 
responsibility for establishing and implementing adequate procedures for 
financial reporting, including an assessment of internal control structures 
and procedures and disclosure of adopted codes of ethics. One of the 
clearest signs of the Act's retaliatory nature is its requirement that a 
company's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) personally certify the report's accuracy. 
Interestingly enough, the Act's emphasis on individual, personal 
misconduct is not precisely the focus of SOX's critics. Instead, they 
target the law's creation of a compliance regime that is perceived as 
burdensome, counterproductive and ineffective. To be sure, the degree 
to which the issue of personal guilt of CEOs and CFOs remains within 
the purview of ongoing corporate law reform, both professionally and in 
popular discourse, is reflected for example in the attention given to 
aspects of management remuneration, which alone has prompted a long 
worldwide debate.11 And it is here where the contributions in Armour and 
McCahery's volume constitute a much-needed and welcome advance in 
the current debates over corporate governance. The authors of their 
collection provide excellent insights into the much more complex 
  
regulatory framework that constitutes corporate governance. 
 
III. 
The contributions to the volume are divided into four sections. 
They are preceded by an introductory essay by the two editors, who take 
on the ever more rarely assumed task of actually "editing" the work of 
their contributors. Armour and McCahery provide a roadmap through the 
volume by engaging with each of the chapters and placing them in the 
context of the larger debates to which they contribute. This will help 
particularly those readers who have no firm prior knowledge of the 
Enron debacle or of the various regulatory responses, and those who 
are particularly interested in corporate law reform from a distinctly 
comparative perspective. Given the predominantly Anglo-Saxon focus of 
much of the volume, it succeeds in mapping and further facilitating a 
dialogue, a dialogue no longer merely between scholars of different 
jurisdictions, but also between differently conceived and evolved 
regulatory cultures. 
The first of the four sections of the book, "Stock Markets and 
Information," contains two articles, the first by Ronald Gilson and Reinier 
Kraakman and the second by Donald Langevoort, which inquire into the 
emergence and reliability of traditional instruments evaluating a firm's 
worth as the decisive signal to stock market investors. In light of the 
inevitable rise of stock market capitalism in the United States and the 
  
United Kingdom, and the pressure on stakeholder capitalist regimes such 
as France, Germany and Japan,12 the editors are correct in asking how 
Enron could for so long hide its destructive dealings from the capital 
market's "eye that sees all." Inviting two of the field's leading scholars to 
build on their previous work on the role of stock market institutions in 
soliciting, interpreting and disseminating information, and to pursue this 
focus within the contemporary capital market environment, provides for 
an intriguing overture to the book's inquiry. It is particularly helpful 
because Gilson and Kraakman's article provides a sober view of how 
much irrationality still exists in our attempts to read stock prices. 
Langevoort's article, discussing various patterns of investor behavior, 
adds to this picture of the uncertainty and irrationality that remain even 
where in fact more information is available to investors. Both sections put 
in context some of the basis for the regulatory retaliation, emphasizing 
the need for better disclosure that took place after Enron. 
The second section is dedicated to the exploration of "Corporate 
Scandals in Historical and Comparative Context" and collects papers on 
the United States (by David Skeel, Jr.), the United Kingdom (by Simon 
Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann), and Italy (by Guido Ferrarini and 
Paolo Giudici). These are followed by a summarizing evaluation of "Why 
the US and Europe Differ" (by John Coffee). This section's 
contributions underscore the importance of seeing beyond the demands 
of the day when responding to crisis. 
  
In tracing the different aspects of various corporate scandals in the 
investigated countries' history, the authors in this section illuminate key 
connections in the way in which scandals were and are being perceived 
and responded to. They succeed in raising some doubt as to the adequacy 
of certain of the regulatory responses. This discussion becomes 
particularly interesting when the responses are reviewed in the context 
of the specific corporate governance regime in which they unfold. It is 
here where the differences between shareholderand stakeholder-
oriented corporate governance regimes are apparently put to the test. If 
scandals do indeed take place in either kind of regime, the analysis of 
their scope and of the subsequent regulatory response speaks not only to 
the concrete scandal but well beyond it, to the nature of the respective 
corporate governance regimes. The authors' inquiry into the reasons why 
measures to prevent corporate fraud often fail-taking the case of Italy, 
for example, where rules even more stringent than SOX failed to 
prevent fraud-ultimately reveals the great need for deeper comparative 
work. 
The chapters provide a powerful illustration of why discussions over 
convergence versus divergence of corporate governance regimes will 
eventually fail in the face of the particular dynamics of regulatory 
change that we can observe in the various jurisdictions. While a first-cut 
distinction between "outsider" and "insider" corporate governance 
regimes is helpful in identifying some of the base variances in regulatory 
  
design,13 we need to direct our attention to the environment in which 
corporate law regulation is unfolding. This environment involves a 
transnational proliferation of norm authors and norm-setting sites, 
changing political coalitions 14 and an intricate mix of regulatory 
approaches. 15 It is from such a reformed investigative agenda that we 
can hope to find more helpful answers to the conundra of Enron, 
WorldCom, Parmalat, and other scandals. 
The third section, entitled "Evaluating Regulatory Responses: The US 
and UK," brings together papers by luminaries including Lucian Bebchuk 
and William Bratton, among others.16 It focuses on the SOX, particularly 
on its regulatory aspirations as well as its blind spots and omissions. 
Given its thematic orientation, this section might be taken as the most 
short-lived in light of its concrete engagement with specific elements of an 
evolving regulatory regime. Yet the individual papers reach beyond their 
contemporary confines, either by building on existing research agendas 
and discussions or by unfolding forward-looking ones. To take an 
example, Lucian Bebchuk's paper forms part of his recent proposals to 
strengthen shareholder rights within the corporation. Likewise, the paper 
by William Bratton contributes to an ongoing discussion over the 
rulesversus principle-based approach in designing accounting rules. 
The final, fourth section of the volume, which takes up more than a 
third of the book's space, is entitled "Reforming EU Company Law and 
Securities Regulation." It constitutes a perfect orchestration of the most 
interesting voices in the current discussion in Europe. It is this part of 
  
the book that arguably carries the greatest weight in deepening the 
transatlantic dialogue on corporate regulation. The chapters-authored by 
Paul Davies, Klaus Hopt, John Armour, Gerard Hertig and Joseph 
McCahery, Eilis Ferran and Luca Enriquesbring to the table the leading 
voices in the current European Community (EC) company law reform 
debate. What these authors shareand, again, this testifies to the editors' 
conscious design of their book and to their commitment to telling a 
coherent story-is a particular perspective on corporate law reform, 
which is ultimately a perspective on the corporation itself. 
All of the authors in this section have in various ways been 
personally involved in advisory or even law proposal commissions within 
the EC in recent years, and are thus the last to be accused of being 
na'ive of the challenges of corporate law reform. Yet their astute 
understanding of the European intricacies of multilevel lawmaking and 
negotiation 17 might also explain their reluctance to expose more clearly 
the challenges that face a more fundamental inquiry into the greater political 
goals of corporate law reform. Such an inquiry would inevitably have to 
reconsider the broader role of business corporations in society if one accepts 
the premise that corporate governance regulation encompasses a dynamic set 
of rules and standards in different, yet intertwined areas of law. The book's 
editors and their authors18 are well aware of this connection, clearly 
expressed for example in Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann's chapter 
(pp. 155-58). Yet their brief presence (that paper is a pithy four pages) 
paradoxically also underlines the absence of another set of issues and 
  
approaches, which the volume could profitably have alluded to and which 
the editors could have sought to integrate in their collection. 
Clive Schmitthoff, writing in 1973, provided a succinct and highly 
sensitive account of the challenges facing corporate law reform in 
Europe.19 He already then pointed to the particular intricacies arising 
for law reform from the complex political economy of an integrating 
Europe. Europe-like Enron-is an enigma, a conundrum, a formula, 
which always stands for more than a given observer can perceive. If one 
thing is certain about European corporate governance reform, however, 
it is its inseparability from the greater process of 
European integration and the relation of Europe to its global 
environment.20 The coming years will show to which degree the 
participants in the debate are able to reflect on the correlation between 
policy choices and theoretical models to explain the business corporation. 
It is certain, and the reviewed book is a much needed illustration of this 
insight, that Europe is still in evolution and that the study of corporate 
law reform is taking place in a vibrant, 24-7, open conceptual and 
experimental laboratory. 
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